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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PROSECUTOR'S REASONS FOR STRIKING THE ONLY MINORITY
MEMBER OF THE VENIRE WERE NOT ADEQUATE TO SHOW A NONRACIAL BASIS FOR THE STRIKE.
The State asserts that the prosecutor's justification for striking Lance Masina, the only

racial minority member of the jury panel, was race-neutral and did not violate either defendant's
or the juror's constitutional rights. Initially, the State argues that defendant only preserved this
issue under a federal equal protection ground and that counsel's mention of violations of
defendant's Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and corresponding clauses under the
State Constitution was not adequate to preserve those claims. The State is wrong. Defendant
was not required to use any "magic words" in order to preserve his constitutional claims. United
States v. McCullah, 87 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 1996). Appellant specifically enunciated the
constitutional provisions violated (RT 215). Those provisions cover fundamental fairness and
the right to a trial by a fair cross section of the community and unbiased jury. The State's
reliance on State v. Span to the contrary is misplaced since the defense counsel in that case
mentioned only Batson error and made no reference to other provisions to the constitution, as did
defendant in the instant case. (Brief of Appellee at 9, State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 337 n.4 (Utah
1991)).
Turning to the prosecutor's purported reason for excusing the only minority panel
member, his reason was tainted by his statement that he did not think a Batson objection was
appropriate because the defendant was not a minority but rather was Caucasian (RT 215). The
court then stated, "Well, let's assume for the purposes of this discussion that he is entitled to
1
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claim the cloak of minority status given the circumstances." (RT 215: 11-14). The prosecutor
then stated that the reason the minority panel member was stricken was his affirmative response
that he knew people in jail (RT 215). However, prospective jurors Farnsworth and Graham also
gave an affirmative response but were not challenged and were empaneled as jurors (RT 34, 41).
(The State claims the prosecutor peremptorily struck two of the four jurors who responded they
knew people in jail, citing Page 103 of the Record of Trial. There is no foundation for such a
statement in the record. Mr. Masina was stricken. Two of the jurors made it on the panel. There
is no indication that the other juror was challenged off the panel: She could simply have been in
the group left behind the first eight jurors remaining after challenges.)
The prosecutor's next reason for peremptorily challenging Mr. Masina was that he was
young and single. Keeping in mind the prosecutor's expressed misunderstanding that because
defendant was Caucasian he could not object to jurors being challenged on the basis of race, the
very general fact that Mr. Masina was young and single does not vindicate the peremptory
challenge. Over-balancing this excuse is the fact the prosecution challenged a disproportionate
number of the minority membership from the panel. In other words, he challenged 100% of the
minority representation from the panel with a peremptory challenge.
With regard to Batson error, a defendant can establish in a prima facie showing a "strong
likelihood" of race-based challenges by pointing out that the prosecutor struck most or all
members of a minority group from the panel. People v. Crittenden 9 Cal.4th 83, 115, 885 P.2d
887 (1994), citing Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and People v. Wheeler 22 Cal.3d 258,
280-81, 583 P.2d 748 (1978). By virtue of this fact alone, the defense made a strong showing of
discriminatory intent and the prosecutor's response that Mr. Masina was young and single was
2
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may be a race-neutral reason in theory but it is such a general reason that it cannot rebut a strong
prima facie case arising out of 100% of all minority representation being peremptorily
challei lged Note tl le pi ose ::i itic 1 11 levei said wl i/y I )eii is :»; y 01 n ig a:i id single woi ild soi i i = how
impact on the person's ability to fulfill Mr. Masina's oath as a furor.
1 i\c State now attempts to state thai .nice ^.juuiaii.

:*is case was a young, single,

incarcerated male the exclusion was justilio' < >! . n u w theie is no basis in !he u \ o .| !. 'lie
State's assertion Miat the proserutoi diew thai iclaiionship between the defendant and the excused
mei i lbei • : ' ; • _ ..\

' = v • -

,.!••..-.

. • voung and singi , : luanr' is no

general, applies to far too many members of the population and is too weak to rebut the strong
showing of exclusion on the ba- : ^ o f u i a
II.

MAi
SUF

- , i ill i , n > h i \ i I- l i ^ M O N S T R A T E S T H A T T H E R E W AS N C • I
* i \ U)\ \( i T O SI PPORT JASON B I G G S ' C O N V I C T I O N

The State argues thai tin", was not a rase in\ .-h i:ig insufficient evidence but w jb mere!} .»
casei i -Ainei u i'Mcsses the jtiiA ehose to hehe\e

! K Stale s argument is incorrect Fven

setting aside whether the defense witnesses were belu \ ahU

> \--L n.--.d

.h ' =mline

that the prosecution evidence on the issue of identification could support a coin ictioi *i
defendant

1 1 le c I lb ' I vo pi ose :i itioi I ( \ iti lesses to idc: i itify defei idai it as tl le si lootei I :H:I>< Cai i • :»il

and Trevor Symes, had their testimony purchased by drastically reduced charges being brought
against him in the ease ul ('arroll and no charges being brought against him in the case of Symes,
rhey adn litted t< > the ise facts c >n tl le \ viti less sli u u 1 (R 1. 119-20, 209) 1 1 n ;< >i il> proseci ition
witness without an overwhelming motive to fabricate because her testimony was not bargained
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foi IT; ' the State w as 1 01 1 Nelsoi 1 tl ic v ictii i i s gii Ifi iei id w ho was ji ist a few feet froi i 1 the si lootei
She identified the shooter a few moments after the shooting while the matter was still fresh in her
m i n d and her senses were still sharpened !•> \hc event as Hi spanu

K I iliu

The defendant is

not I lispai lie (R 1 215). 1 1 le pi oseci ltioi i ael ;:i IOW ledged 1 le is i: lot a i i iei i tbei of ai i;> i i hi ioi ity
group (RT215)
r

i ;sc loregoing facts wei.- n u ,-;;i\ \iKi> p i ^ i u ^ ; r . i:ic prosecutioi l to idei itify the

defendant and oile of them, the only credible fact, showed that defendant was not present. Even
though on appeal the Court reviews the evidence in light most favorably to the prevailing party,
]\ lit Biggs has i i lai shaled tl le evidei ice w 1 )ict i dei :i v :»i istrates ii ISI lfficiei it e\ idei ice of identity •
Scudder v. Kennecott Cooper ('orp. 886 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1994). Consequently, defendant's
conviction should be reversed because it is not supported by sufficient evidence,
III.

DEFENDANT DID BRING THE P R O S E C U T O R I A L CONDUCT TO THE
COURT'S ATTENTION AND ASKED FOR A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION IN I
TIMELY MANNER.
The purpose of requiring objections at trial to preserve appellate issues is to hHng errors

to tl le ti ial coi n t's attei itioi I so tl le ecu it t ai id opposii ig coi u lsel hav e a fail Dppoi ti in ii

•••'<•"•' s s

the objection, such as with a corrective admonition. State v. Hales 625 P.2d 1290 i 2(>2 (Utah
1^

::'..- >..aic a i g u c , in.j because the inai judge determined that no appropriate or jeuion was

m a d e and that an objection was not m a d e in a timely manner, defendant waived his prosecutorial
misconduct argument The record shows otherwise and the prosecutor in the case has
acki lowledged in opei 1 coi ii t oi I a hearii ig oi I tl le stipi llatioi I tl lat tl le ;t i lattei vv as raised

rhe

prosecutor stated that he recalled the defense counsel calling for a sidebar conference where: 1)
he notified the court that the prosecutor had referred to defendant as a "light skinned Mexican"
4
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A \ - 11:1 i till ie object! 1 thei e i\< as i 10 e\ idei ice to si lppoi t si ich at i assei tion; 2) he asked the coi u t to
instruct the jury that the prosecutor's argument was not to be coi isidered as evidence; and 3) the
court noted the objection (September 10, 1999 RT 5-6, attached in Appendix hereto) The matter
was clearly raised before the cc i n: t ai id tl ie : : i n: 11 lad ai i lpk oppoi ti n lit) to con ect tl ie • zi i c r
during instructions.
The second

ISSIK. IS W

luiliu" the matter was raised iiI a timely manner, 1'he prosecutor

n lade the staten ici it aboi it whei c he can ie fi oi i t, defei idai it v 'as ki low i l as a "Wedo" oi ligl it
skinned Mexican near the end of Ins argument (II K !
imm-juiiii-j!\ .:!!-. !*tlie prosecuu : ;uai

OH;C::,.;. A IUS

where the issue was raised (II R l 380:1-41

;

""; I wo pages later MI the transcript.

argument, m*, deiensc asked loi ii.c s^!L-har

! he iury had not yet exited the courtroom and was

given some insli ^ lions h\ 11K- * ourt, although n.

M

v one rcqucslctl I'TT R T "SO) The couri had

before the j u r y left the courtroom but no curative instruction was made.
Because the objection was made in a timely manner and the court had ample opportunity
t<

. . , - • *

-.

,

jv/l

, u «, , ^ K .

prosecutes ial nu^eonduc! argument un the merits. That argument demonstiates prejuuicial error.
I

I 11 h ( '<1 I IK I ("AN SIMPI Y REVERSE THE GANG ENH 4.NCEMENT
\> III III III I il \ REMAND
The State concedes that the gang enhancement violated this Court's pronouncement in

State v. Lopes9 980 P.2d 191 (t Jtah 1999), The State suggests that the matter be remanded for a
jury trial on the issi ie Althoi igli nc >t n :t tin ? i c M lord, counsel notes I or the Coi irt's benefit that the
prosecutor has indicated he will I lot go forward on the gang enhancement.
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CONCU'SION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully requests that the guilty verdict and his
sentence be reversed.
J.-iO.

Respectfully Submitted,
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Samuel D. McVey
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l have provided to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn,
2 have been forwarded to me and signed by both of you,
3 having to do with an alleged statement or direction of
CARLOS A. ESQUEDA
4 this Court at the conclusion of the State's argument in
Deputy D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y
5 the trial.
6
MR. MC VEY: That's correct, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: All right. I wanted for you,
SAMUEL D. MC VEY
8
Mr.
McVey,
to state your position for the record, and
Legal Defender
9 then I'll entertain Mr. Esqueda's comments, and then I
10 will decide whether I'm going to accede to the
11 stipulation or not.
12
Mr. McVey, you may proceed.
13
MR. MC VEY: Your Honor, you are familiar
14 with the statement that is in issue here. We think
15 that that may raise an issue on appeal of whether a
16 fact not in evidence may have been presented to the
17 jury and that they can have an issue of whether it was
18 prejudicial before the appellate court. But
j
19 immediately following the prosecutor's argument, rather
20 than excuse the jury, we asked for a bench conference
21 and asked the Court -- mentioned the statement to the
22 Court and asked the Court for a curative instruction.
23 And the Court indicated at that time that it would not
24 give a curative instruction of that kind. And I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
believe
that later the Court did tell the inrv th.it th^
1
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Page 3 1
1
(PROCEEDINGS)
2
THE COURT: state of Utah v. Jason Randy
3 Biggs. I think we've had him transported; is that
4 right?
5
This is Case No. 98-1378.
6
Mr. McVey, you are appearing on behalf of
7 this Defendant?
8
MR. MC VEY: I am, Your Honor?
9
THE COURT: Mr. Esqueda, you are here for the
10 State?
11
MR. ESQUEDA: Yes, Your Honor.
12
THE COURT: And, presumably, we have a Deputy
13 Attorney General involved here, Miss Swatnick
14 [phonetic], is she in the courtroom?
15
MR. ESQUEDA: 1 don't believe so.
16
THE COURT: All right.
17
MR. ESQUEDA: I think we can probably-18
THE COURT: Just muddle around without her.
19
Are you Jason Randy Biggs?
20
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
21
THE COURT: Counsel, the reason that I have
22 placed this on the calendar is because, as you both are
23 aware, you have proposed by stipulation an amendment to
24 or supplement to the record in this case. The
25 supplement is as stated, I assume, in the documents you

A P P E A R A N C E S

Page 9
1 acknowledge that it was at the conclusion of the
2 State's rebuttal. And if, in deed, that was the
3 timing, it would have been at the precise moment the
4 jury is leaving the courtroom. But, anyway, I will
5 notify you of my decision.
6
MR. MC VEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
8
(Hearing adjourned.)
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Page 10
1
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4
I, Carlton S. Way, do certify that I am a
5 Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court
6 Reporter in and for the State of Utah; that as such
7 reporter, I reported the occasion of the proceedings of
8 the above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time and
9 place. That the proceeding was reported by me in
10 stenotype using computer-aided transcription real-time
1 1 technology consisting of pages 1 through 9, inclusive.
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That the same constitutes a true and correct

1 3 transcription of the said proceedings.
14

That I am not of kin or otherwise associated
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Page 5
1 this: First of all, the language being sought as a
1 standard instruction, that arguments of counsel are not
2
supplement is, in my estimation, not entirely complete
2 evidence. But we just wanted to point out that we did
3 to the extent that it provides somewhat of a
3 raise that statement to the Court at the conclusion of
4 mischaracterization of the statement made by
4 the prosecutor's argument, and that's the only reason
5 Mr. Esqueda in the actual transcript. It is out of
5 for the stipulation.
6 context, in other words; secondarily, I'm quite
6
THE COURT: And, Mr. McVey, I take it having
7 concerned about the timing of this, because the request
7 now reviewed the transcript there is no record of this
8 for the sidebar, while it is alleged came after the
8 discussion that you are telling me about?
9 State's initial argument to the jury, in deed, is
9
MR. MC VEY: That's right, Your Honor. It
10 reflected as having come at the conclusion of the
10 just says that there was a bench conference.
11 State's rebuttal, which would be at the moment when the
11
THE COURT: You are relying therefore upon
12 jury is exiting the courtroom. Consequently, I would
12 your specific recollection?
13
not have indicated at that stage when the jury is
13
MR. MC VEY: That's correct, Your Honor.
14 leaving the courtroom that I would give a supplemental
14
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McVey.
15 instruction, a curative instruction, unless one was
15
MR. MCVEY: Thank you.
16 presented to me in writing to present to the jury once
\l6
THE COURT: And, by the way, I might indicate
17 they were deliberating. I have no specific
17 you are the one that initiated this proposed supplement
18 recollection of the discussion, and it, though, seems
18 to the record?
19 to me to be out of keeping with what my procedure
19
MR. MC VEY: That's correct, Your Honor.
20 normally would have been. I'm only too pleased to tell
20
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Esqueda, what's
21 jurors that the statements of counsel are not evidence,
21 your position here?
22 and I tell them repeatedly through trials just so they
22
MR. ESQUEDA: I am not opposing the
23 are all clear on that.
23 supplement to the record. The purpose - from my
24
But having said that, I want to take a last
24 standpoint, I believe it was argument, it was
25 look at the transcript, and then I will rule on this
25 acceptable argument that the Defendant raised in their
Page 6

Page 8
1 request to supplement the record and notify you by
1 closing argument a misidentification by one of the
2 minute entry.
2 witnesses who said -- Mr. McVey raised this to the
3 jury, that she identified a person as looking like a
3
MR. MC VEY: Thank you, Your Honor. If I
4 Mexican, and my response to that was in rebuttal to his
4 could just address those two points you raised?
5
THE COURT: Yes, you may.
5 argument. So I think it's entirely appropriate.
6
MR. MC VEY: if we have taken it out of
6
My recollection is we did ask for a sidebar,
7 context, that will be clear in the record, and
7 that the Court granted that sidebar, we briefly
8 discussed that issue and the objection, the Court noted
8 certainly that would be something that could be
9 the objection, in my recollection, and indicated that a
9 addressed on appeal. And then as to the timing, we
10 waited until the conclusion of the argument simply as a
10 curative instruction would be given at the close of our
11 argument. And the Court did make that curative
11 matter of professional courtesy. Mr. Esqueda had
112 instruction, that the arguments of the attorneys are
12 obviously worked very hard on his argument and it was
13 not considered as evidence.
13 an excellent argument, and we didn't want to jump up
14
THE COURT: So the position you are taking,
14 and keep interrupting. But that's why we brought it up
15 Mr. Esqueda, is that a curative instruction was given
15 immediately at the conclusion. And the timeliness of
16 but that it was not at the precise moment requested, it
16 it would also be something that the Attorney General
17 was later in oral argument?
17 could raise on appeal.
18
THE COURT: Well, in that regard, the timing
18
MR. ESQUEDA: That's correct. It was given
19 as an instruction to the Jury when instructions were
19 context, I think, is somewhat pertinent here because
20 read, that argument of counsel are not to be considered
20 your motion refers to having approached the bench for
21 as evidence. That's my recollection,
21 the sidebar at the conclusion of the State's initial
22
THE COURT: Counsel, I -- I'm going to take
22 argument -23 this decision under advisement. I will rule by minute
23
MR. MC VEY: I believe 24 entry ruling shortly. IDigitized
do - and
I
think
it
is
fair
24
THE
COURT:
--1 believe - but,
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law
School, BYU.
Machine-generated
contain
errors.
25 to tell you that I have certain reservations
about OCR, may25
nevertheless,
it appears to me now that you both

